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ABSTRACT 
This paper assesses whether societal culture moderates the relationship between human resource 
management (HRM) practices and organizational performance. Drawing on matched employer-employee 
data from 387 organizations and 7,187 employees in 14 countries, our findings show a positive 
relationship between HRM practices combined in High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) and 
organizational performance across societal cultures. Three dimensions of societal culture assessed (power 
distance, in-group collectivism, and institutional collectivism) did not moderate this relationship. Drawing 
on the Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) model, we further consider the effectiveness of three 
bundles of HRM practices (skill-enhancing, motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-enhancing practices). 
This analysis shows opportunity-enhancing practices (e.g., participative work design and decision-
making) are less effective in high-power-distance cultures. Nevertheless, in markedly different countries 
we find combinations of complementary HPWS and bundles of AMO practices appear to outweigh the 
influence of societal culture and enhance organizational performance. 
 




      INTRODUCTION 
Convergence towards best practice in management across different national and cultural settings remains 
a central debate in the International Business (IB) and Cross-Cultural Management (CCM) literatures. An 
important stream of research has focused on whether human resource management (HRM) practices are 
converging towards a globally recognized best practice approach (Edwards, Sánchez-Manges, Jalette, 
Lavelle, & Minbaeva, 2016; Farndale, Brewster, Ligthart, & Poutsma, 2017; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007). 
Central to this issue is whether, in different countries, organizations with technically superior HRM best 
practices outperform their competitors, suggesting an economic imperative towards convergence. 
Companies are offered contrasting advice regarding the effectiveness of HRM practices in different 
countries from two opposite perspectives - the universalistic perspective (‘best practice’) implies 
convergence, and the contingency perspective (‘best fit’) continued divergence (Festing, 2012). Our study 
therefore explores whether, in markedly different countries, organizations that have implemented HRM 
best practices report enhanced performance (the universalistic perspective), or alternatively whether 
societal culture moderates the relationship between HRM best practices and organizational performance 
(the contingency perspective). 
The universalistic perspective has produced compelling large-scale and meta-analytic evidence of a 
positive association between organizational performance and a set of complementary best practices that 
comprise High-Performance Work Systems (HPWS) (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006; Wright & 
Ulrich, 2017). Across the last twenty years, many single-country studies have reproduced these findings 
and indicate convergence towards a universalistic HPWS-organizational performance relationship (Bae, 
Chen, & Lawler, 1998; Rabl, Jayasinghe, Gerhart, & Kühlmann, 2014). The conclusion drawn is that 
organizations in all countries should benefit from adopting HPWS to enhance financial performance. 
The alternative contingency perspective emphasizes cross-national variation in the effectiveness of 
individual HRM best practices. Focusing on isolated HRM practices such as performance appraisals or 
flexible work arrangements, rather than assessing a company’s overall HRM system, studies report that 
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best practices are not associated with higher levels of employee commitment and organizational 
performance in all countries (Newman & Nollen, 1996; Peretz & Fried, 2012; Peretz, Fried, & Levi, 
2018). These findings are consistent with GLOBE’s culturally endorsed theory of leadership (CLT), that 
highlights the influence of societal culture on the way organizations are structured and managed (House, 
Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). The implication is that organizations should adopt HRM 
practices that ‘best fit’ with societal culture to enhance performance, rather than so-called ‘best practices’ 
(Aycan, 2005).  
Both perspectives have limitations this paper seeks to address. The universalistic perspective 
provides impressive cumulative evidence, but to date has relied on single-country studies using a wide 
range of different measures (Combs et al., 2006). We lack analysis of primary data from large cross-
national samples that use standardized measures of HPWS and organizational performance to assess these 
claims. In contrast, contingency arguments remain theoretically compelling, but the empirical support is 
weaker given the absence of large-scale and meta-analytic evidence. These studies also focus on 
individual practices to the neglect of the broader HRM system, and rarely assess ultimate strategic 
outcomes such as financial performance.  
Addressing these limitations empirically, we develop cross-national primary data to examine 
whether societal culture, the key aspect of national context emphasized in the IB/CCM literature, 
moderates the relationship between HPWS and organizational performance. This involved the collection 
of primary and extensive matched employer-employee data, using consistent measures at workplace-
level, from 387 organizations and 7,187 employees in 14 diverse countries.  
 Our study makes two theoretical contributions. First, we propose societal culture may moderate the 
effectiveness of individual HRM best practices (the contingency perspective), but not the effectiveness of 
HRM practices combined in HPWS (the universalistic perspective). We suggest isolated HRM practices 
do not increase workforce certainty, clarity, and direction. In such circumstances, GLOBE’s CLT 
suggests employees rely on decision-making heuristics provided by societal culture to interpret 
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organizational events (House et al., 2004). In contrast, complementary practices in HPWS send clear and 
reinforced leadership messages to increase workforce certainty, clarity, and direction. HPWS may 
therefore outweigh the influence of societal culture on workforce attitudes, behaviors, and job 
performance. 
 Second, we draw on the Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) model that suggests organizations 
may usefully implement bundles of combined HRM practices- skill-enhancing, motivation-enhancing, 
and opportunity-enhancing practices. We propose bundles of AMO practices have theoretically distinct 
roles in sending clear and reinforced leadership messages: skill-enhancing practices clarify human capital 
requirements (the types of employees hired and skills required); motivation-enhancing practices reinforce 
productive role behaviors; and opportunity-enhancing practices encourage high-involvement. We 
therefore also consider whether complementary bundles of AMO practices outweigh the influence of 
societal culture and enhance organizational performance in diverse countries.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Universalistic Perspective and HPWS 
Theorizing in HRM research in the last two decades has proceeded along the lines of the core debate 
between the contrasting universalistic and contingency perspectives (Delery & Doty, 1996). The 
universalistic perspective has provided compelling evidence of the positive relationship between 
technically superior HRM ‘best practices’ and organizational performance (Becker & Huselid, 1998; 
Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998). Adopting a more macro viewpoint to assess a company’s overall HRM 
system, consistent evidence has emerged of a positive association between organizational performance 
and complementary/ mutually reinforcing ‘best practices’ comprising HPWS. This system includes 
selective recruitment, extensive training, internal promotion, performance appraisals, work teams, and 
employee participation practices among others. The alignment of interrelated ‘best practices’ that 
complement and support each other (termed internal or horizontal fit) creates an HRM system that 
conceptually increases employee skills (human capital), motivation, and opportunities to contribute 
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towards the achievement of organizational goals (Huselid, 1995). An overall correlation estimated at .20 
between HPWS and organizational performance is derived from studies using a range of subjective and 
objective performance measures, collecting cross-sectional and single industry data, and measuring 
HPWS practices using different survey items and scales (Combs et al., 2006; Wright & Ulrich, 2017). 
 Notwithstanding concerns that HPWS practices are culture-bound and reflect convergence to a 
dominant U.S. approach (Brewster, 1995; Festing, 2012), initial findings from U.S. studies have been 
replicated in many countries (e.g., Bae et al., 1998; Yalabik, Chen, Lawler, & Kim, 2008). Subsequent 
meta-analysis of 156 such studies in 29 countries reports a corrected correlation of 0.28 between HPWS 
and organizational performance, and a positive relationship in each country assessed (Rabl et al., 2014). 
This evidence suggests global convergence towards a best practice HRM system associated with 
enhanced organizational performance. We provide the first systematic analysis of this issue that draws on 
primary data from a large cross-sectional sample, using standardized measures of HPWS and 
organizational performance. Accordingly, we assess the following universalistic proposition: 
H1: HPWS are positively associated with organizational performance in a diverse range of 
countries. 
 Organizations may usefully combine HRM practices in two ways: as systems described above 
(HPWS); and bundles of related HRM practices. The Ability-Motivation-Opportunity (AMO) model 
proposes organizational performance may be enhanced by bundles of HRM practices that increase 
employee skills, motivation, and opportunities to contribute (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 
2000; Gardner, Wright, & Moynihan, 2011; Liao, Toya, Lepak, & Hong, 2009; Subramony, 2009). Meta-
analysis of 115 relevant studies has provided support for AMO propositions, demonstrating a positive 
relationship between organizational performance and three bundles of HRM practices- skill-enhancing, 
motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-enhancing practices (Jiang, Lepak, Hu, & Baer, 2012). Bundles of 
skill-enhancing practices, such as selective recruitment and training, aim to provide employees with 
appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities. Motivation-enhancing practices, such as internal promotion 
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and performance appraisals, increase employee motivation to provide discretionary effort. Opportunity-
enhancing practices, such as work teams and employee participation, increase opportunities for 
employees to contribute towards organizational objectives.  
 We provide the first systematic application of the AMO model to IB/CCM studies in order to help 
clarify the key mechanisms and theoretical logic of a universalistic HPWS-organizational performance 
relationship, and identify the relative contribution of HRM bundles. This involves assessing whether 
national differences moderate the positive relationship between organizational performance and skill-
enhancing, motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-enhancing practices: 
H2: (a) Skill-enhancing practices, (b) motivation-enhancing practices, and (c) opportunity-
enhancing practices are positively associated with organizational performance in a diverse range of 
countries.   
Contingency Perspective and Societal Culture 
In contrast to the universalistic relationship between HPWS and organizational performance proposed 
above, the contingency perspective suggests adopting HRM practices that ‘best fit’ with pertinent aspects 
of the organization’s context will enhance organizational performance (Delery & Doty, 1996). This 
involves vertical alignment between HRM practices and aspects of the organization’s internal context 
(e.g. size, business strategy, technology) and external context (e.g. societal culture or institutional factors 
such as the economic and business system, laws/regulations, labor market, and industrial relations 
system) (Jackson & Schuler, 1995). IB/CCM research focuses specifically on the relationship between 
HRM and societal culture or institutional factors (Fey, Morgulis-Yakushev, Park, & Björkman, 2009; 
Vaiman & Brewster, 2015). We concentrate here on societal culture because it is central to the view that 
universalistic best practices do not exist in the international HRM literature (Ollo-López, Bayo-Moriones, 
& Larraza-Kintana, 2011), and to assessments of whether national differences moderate the HPWS-
organizational performance relationship (see Rabl et al., 2014). Furthermore, studies exploring 
institutional factors generally seek to explain national differences in HRM practices rather than 
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organizational performance (Aycan, 2005: 1108).  
 It is widely accepted that key dimensions of societal culture differentiate between countries in 
many areas of management research and influence the effectiveness of HRM practices (Caprar, Devinney, 
Kirkman, & Caligiuri, 2015; Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & 
Yoon, 1994; Newman & Nollen, 1996). Societal culture and values are considered to have a more 
enduring influence on HRM practices than institutional factors, because culture is deeply embedded, 
transcends the workplace, and relatively immutable (Schuler & Rovosky, 1998). As such, societal culture 
is central to employees’ perception and understanding of work, and the treatment they expect, with 
implications for attitudes, behaviors, and job performance (Newman & Nollen, 1996; Robert, Probst, 
Martocchio, Drasgow, & Lawler, 2000). Furthermore, the impact of societal culture on organizational 
performance is often inexplicit, poorly understood, and overlooked (Aycan, Kanungo, & Sinha, 1999; 
Peretz & Fried, 2012).  
 Focusing on societal culture does not suggest institutional factors are unimportant for the 
effectiveness of HRM practices. Societal culture is not independent of institutional factors, as widely held 
values interact and co-evolve with economic and business systems, laws/regulations, labor markets, and 
industrial relations systems (Alesina & Giuliano, 2005; Aycan et al., 2000; Brewster, 1995; Vaiman & 
Brewster, 2015). Furthermore, focusing on societal culture does not suggest aspects of the organization’s 
internal context (e.g., organizational size and age, industrial technology) are unimportant, and we control 
for these in assessing whether societal culture moderates the HPWS-organizational performance 
relationship.   
 Regarding the evidence in support of the contingency perspective, a range of micro-analytic studies 
report that societal culture moderates the effectiveness of individual HRM practices. For example, 
performance appraisals linked to incentive pay are associated with lower labor turnover and absenteeism 
in countries with low power distance, high individualism, high future orientation, and high uncertainty 
avoidance (Peretz & Fried, 2012). Organizations using flexible work arrangements also report lower labor 
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turnover and absenteeism in countries with low institutional collectivism, in‐group collectivism, power 
distance, and uncertainty avoidance (Peretz et al., 2018). Diversity programs also had a stronger 
association with lower labor turnover and absenteeism where societal cultures are supportive of diversity 
(Peretz, Levi, & Fried, 2015). However, these studies focus on individual practices to the neglect of the 
broader HRM system, despite evidence that combinations of practices are required to enhance 
organizational performance, and rarely assess ultimate strategic outcomes such as financial performance.  
 Given this, the system effects of complementary HPWS and AMO bundles (rather than individual 
HRM practices) may create a skilled, motivated, and flexible workforce, and have a positive impact on 
strategic performance outcomes (productivity and financial performance) regardless of societal culture. 
Rabl et al.’s (2014) meta-analysis goes someway to addressing the focus on individual practices by 
adopting a more macro focus on the HRM system. The findings supported the universalistic perspective 
in reporting a positive HPWS-organizational performance relationship in all 19 countries with two or 
more studies available. However, it found no support for hypotheses suggesting a stronger HPWS-
organizational performance relationship in countries with low power distance and low collectivism. As 
explained below, however, these theoretical relationships are more complex than Rabl et al. (2014) 
portray. We provide the first systematic application of AMO theory in IB/CCM to derive more precise 
propositions on this question.  
Theoretical Framework to Assess Societal-Culture Fit 
Contingency models of societal-culture fit in HRM propose societal culture will moderate the 
effectiveness of HRM practices, and organizations should therefore align HRM practices with societal 
culture (Aycan et al., 1999, 2000). These models provide a cross-national theoretical framework to assess 
whether societal culture moderates the HPWS-organizational performance relationship. Drawing on 
GLOBE’s CLT (House et al., 2004), societal culture is regarded as the main aspect of organizational 
context that determines employee expectations and behaviors. It provides decision-making heuristics or 
rules of thumb that guide employee expectations and behaviors in often complex and uncertain work 
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environments. HRM systems are fundamental mechanisms through which organizational leaders translate 
their overall strategies, philosophies, and visions into practice (Becker & Huselid, 1998). HRM practices 
congruent with societal culture convey clear messages that leaders will reward employee behavior in a 
manner consistent with ingrained values. Therefore, such contingency models propose congruence 
between societal culture and HRM practices will enhance organizational performance.  
 Congruence is defined here as alignment, consistency, and fit between HRM practices and deeply 
held cultural values and expectations with regard to employees’ understanding and approach to work, and 
how they expect to be treated (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Studies indicate congruence between HRM 
practices and societal culture is a precursor to positive employee attitudes, behaviors, and job 
performance (Robert et al., 2000). It results in less distracted and more productive employees (Schuler & 
Rovosky, 1998), reduced organizational friction (Fitzsimmons & Stamper, 2014), perceived procedural 
justice (Wu & Chaturvedi, 2009), and job satisfaction (Hui, Au, & Fock, 2004; Robert et al., 2000). 
Misalignment, inconsistency, and limited fit between societal culture and HRM practices indicate friction 
or incompatibility between leadership and workforce expectations. This inhibits the optimal 
implementation and use of HRM practices, with managers and employees feeling distracted, 
uncomfortable, dissatisfied, and ultimately less productive (Jiang, Colakoglu, Lepak, Blasi, & Kruse, 
2015; Newman & Nollen, 1996). We assess congruence from the organization-level to consider whether 
societal culture moderates the HPWS-organizational performance relationship. Hence, we draw on this 
theoretical framework to consider whether societal culture moderates the relationship between HPWS 
practices and organizational performance (Aycan et al., 2000; Brewster, 1995; Newman & Nollen, 1996).  
Dimensions of Societal Culture, HPWS and AMO 
Societal Culture. Regarding the selection of pertinent dimensions of societal culture, prior studies 
concentrate on the dimensions considered theoretically most relevant to the HPWS-organizational 
performance relationship (e.g., Aycan, 2005; Peretz & Fried, 2012; Rabl et al., 2014; Sagie & Aycan, 
2003). Following advice to concentrate on a small number of ‘well-chosen dimensions’ (Zaheer, Spring 
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Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012: 13), we focus on power distance and individualism-collectivism. These 
represent key dimensions of national cultural differences in CCM research (e.g., Bochner & Hesketh, 
1994; Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2017; Kim et al., 1994), with specific implications for societal-level 
outcomes (e.g., Basabe & Ros, 2005; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). These dimensions are 
also especially relevant for HRM and performance. For example, power distance may influence the 
effectiveness of recruitment, reward, and communication practices (Fey et al., 2009). Individualism may 
influence whether worker’s value an emphasis on individual goals and contributions, or prefer a collective 
emphasis on cooperation and team contribution, job security, and training provision (Hofstede, 2001; 
Rode, Huang, & Flynn, 2016). As such, these dimensions may moderate the relationship between HRM 
practices and organizational performance. 
 Table 1 presents the congruence between our selected societal culture dimensions and 17 HPWS 
practices, as reported by relevant studies identified in 11 major journals from 1996-2017 (publications 
following the start of the debate in Huselid’s (1995) classic paper). This involved searching online library 
databases (e.g. ABI/Inform Global and PsychINFO) and leading journals. Consensus regarding 
component HPWS practices remains elusive (Wright & Ulrich, 2017). We assess the presence/absence of 
17 practices including 11 of 13 often-included measures (Combs 2006).1 Table 1 includes citations to 
summaries of evidence where possible rather than each individual study to aid parsimony. 
…Insert Table 1 here… 
 Our first societal culture dimension of power distance refers to ‘the degree to which members of a 
society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally’ (House et al., 2004). Power, authority, 
and the unequal dissemination of information characterize high-power-distance cultures, in which status 
hierarchy is rigid and institutionalized, and inequality accepted (Hofstede, 2001). In low-power-distance 
cultures, people believe inequality in treatment, rights, and privileges between individuals should be 
minimized (House et al., 2004). Rabl et al. (2014) proposed HPWS are less effective in high-power-
distance cultures, in which managers base their recruitment and reward decisions on criteria such as 
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status, rather than objective measures of performance. Additionally, in these cultures, managerial 
reluctance to share information will undermine the effectiveness of attempts to increase employee 
participation in order to address organizational problems. In contrast, HPWS are potentially more 
effective in low-power-distance cultures, with a greater emphasis placed on ability and performance, self-
management, and participation. Therefore, studies report limited congruence between high power distance 
and 13 individual HPWS practices including selection tests, incentive systems, and participative job 
design (Table 1, column 2). Hence:  
 
H3(a): The relationship between HPWS and organizational performance is weaker in high-power-
distance cultures. 
 
 Table 1 classifies this literature into three established AMO bundles to assess theoretical 
congruence between related HRM practices and societal culture (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gardner et al., 
2011; Jiang et al., 2012; Subramony, 2009). Panel 1 suggests the relationship between skill-enhancing 
practices and power distance is not clear-cut. On one hand, high-power-distance is likely to deter 
managers from involving subordinates in selection processes, and encourage a more hierarchical approach 
to selection decisions (Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page, 1999). Lower training provision is also evident 
in high-power-distance cultures, perhaps reflecting a preference for unilateral decision-making to protect 
managerial power and status (Coget, 2011; Peretz & Rosenblatt, 2011; Rabl et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, studies also report that power distance does not influence the effectiveness of aptitude and 
performance tests, given high validity, low costs, and professional standardization (Steiner, 2012). 
Furthermore, studies provide scant evidence that power distance affects training effectiveness. Taken 
together, prior studies therefore suggest power distance will not moderate the impact of skill-enhancing 
practices on organizational performance.  
 Moving onto motivation-enhancing practices, prior research predicts discomfort in high-power-
distance cultures if line managers are not the primary evaluators in reward decisions (Table 1, panel 2). In 
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this context, incentive systems based on objective performance will reduce managerial discretion and 
appear unsuitable. The emphasis on workers’ rights in flexible work arrangements and equal opportunities 
policies also appears inappropriate as this undermines managerial authority (Aycan, 2005; Peretz et al., 
2015, 2018). Motivation-enhancing practices may therefore be less effective in high-power-distance 
cultures, as discomfort with restrictions to managerial decision-making hinders its effective 
implementation.  
 The main source of incongruence between HPWS and high-power-distance cultures relates to 
opportunity-enhancing practices (Table 1, panel 3). In such cultures, attempts to increase workforce 
involvement and empowerment may cause significant unease, and undermine the effectiveness of work 
teams, functional flexibility, and employee participation. Hierarchical rather than shared decision-making 
is widespread in such cultures, with managers protecting privileged access to information, and employees 
distrustful of practices to increase participation (Huang, Rode, & Schroeder, 2011; Hui et al., 2004; Jiang 
et al., 2015). This mismatch between cultural preferences and opportunity-enhancing practices may 
hinder job performance as well as overall organizational outcomes. Hence:  
 
H3(b): The relationship between skill-enhancing practices and organizational performance is not 
moderated by power distance. 
 
H3(c): The relationship between motivation-enhancing practices and organizational performance is 
weaker in high-power-distance cultures. 
 
H3(d): The relationship between opportunity-enhancing practices and organizational performance 
is weaker in high-power-distance cultures. 
  
 Moving onto individualism-collectivism, Rabl and colleagues’ (2014) proposed countries with high 
individualism (low collectivism) offered the best context for the success of HPWS, given practices such 
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as individual incentive pay reflect U.S. values. However, this overlooks other HPWS practices such as 
work teams and quality circles that are congruent with Japanese values (Bae et al., 1998; Yalabik et al., 
2008). Furthermore, employment security and labor-management participation are institutional features of 
central and northern European economies (Brewster, 1995). GLOBE’s distinction between two 
dimensions of individualism-collectivism (in-group collectivism and institutional collectivism) (House et 
al., 2004) helps clarify these issues.  
 In-group collectivism refers to ‘the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and 
cohesiveness in their organizations and families’ (ibid.). High in-group collectivist cultures (e.g., China 
and India) emphasize obligations, duties, and ties to tight in-groups of family members, workgroups, or 
close friends (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Meeting in-group expectations, obligations, and close ties are 
prioritized over individual goals. Practices such as internal promotion and work teams may therefore 
enhance organizational performance in such cultures, because these practices promote in-group harmony 
(Table 1, column 3). However, four HPWS practices appear to threaten in-group harmony and may not 
enhance organizational performance in high in-group collectivism cultures. Among these, incentive 
compensation and performance appraisals emphasize individual performance over organizational 
cohesiveness, and flexible work arrangements and equal opportunities policies emphasize personal needs 
and equal rights over obligations and duties (Aycan, 2005; Peretz et al., 2018). Hence:  
 
H4(a): The relationship between HPWS and organizational performance is weaker in high in-group 
collectivism cultures. 
  
 Regarding skill-enhancing practices, in-group collectivism appears incongruent with aptitude and 
performance testing in recruitment decisions, given preference for in-group membership and close ties 
when recruiting (Aycan, 2005: 1088-9). However, the effectiveness of induction and training appear 
unaffected in these cultures (Table 1, panel 1). The main source of incongruence between HPWS and in-
group collectivism relates to motivation-enhancing practices (Table 1, panel 2). As explained above, this 
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reflects discomfort with practices such as incentive compensation and flexible work arrangements, given 
the emphasis on differences between individuals rather than in-group harmony, cohesiveness, and 
obligations. There is less evidence that in-group collectivism moderates the effectiveness of opportunity-
enhancing practices (Table 1, panel 3). Hence: 
 
H4(b): The relationship between skill-enhancing practices and organizational performance is not 
moderated by in-group collectivism. 
 
H4(c): The relationship between motivation-enhancing practices and organizational performance is 
weaker in high in-group collectivism cultures.  
 
H4(d): The relationship between opportunity-enhancing practices and organizational performance 
is not moderated by in-group collectivism. 
  
 Institutional collectivism is defined as ‘the degree to which organizational and societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward the collective distribution of resources and collective action’ (House et 
al., 2004). Cultures high in institutional collectivism (e.g., China and Japan) emphasize societal good over 
individual relationships, and rely on large group memberships of organizations, society-at-large, or the 
nation, for identity and status (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In such cultures, outcomes are favored that 
benefit the larger organization rather than specific individuals or groups. Institutional collectivism appears 
congruent with four HPWS practices that emphasize collective rewards for organizational loyalty- 
training, extensive benefits, employment security, and work teams. Hence:  
 
H5(a): The relationship between HPWS and organizational performance is stronger in high-




 Regarding skill-enhancing practices, institutional collectivism encourages training investment to 
build mutual obligations between organizations and employees (Aycan, 2005; Rode et al., 2016), 
although there is no evidence training is more effective (Table 1, panel 1). The main source of congruence 
between HPWS and institutional collectivism relates to motivation-enhancing practices (Table 1, panel 2). 
Institutional collectivism appears congruent with extensive benefits and employment security, as these 
practices represent collective rewards for organizational loyalty. However, studies report contradictory 
evidence on congruence with flexible work arrangements and equality practices. There is scant evidence 
to suggest institutional collectivism will moderate the effectiveness of opportunity-enhancing practices 
(Table 1, panel 3). Hence: 
 
H5(b): The relationship between skill-enhancing practices and organizational performance is not 
moderated by institutional collectivism. 
 
H5(c): The relationship between motivation-enhancing practices and organizational performance is 
stronger in high-institutional-collectivism cultures.   
 
H5(d): The relationship between opportunity-enhancing practices and organizational performance 
is not moderated by institutional collectivism. 
 
 Summarizing, the studies in Table 1 show the effectiveness of HPWS practices in different societal 
cultures will vary across AMO bundles. Most notably, power distance may reduce the effectiveness of 
opportunity-enhancing practices, and in-group collectivism may reduce the effectiveness of motivation-
enhancing practices. In contrast, institutional collectivism appears to increase the effectiveness of 
motivation-enhancing practices. One interpretation is that individual HPWS practices without other 
complementary practices may not send sufficiently clear and reinforced leadership messages to the 
workforce. In such circumstances, GLOBE’s CLT proposes that employees will rely on decision-making 
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heuristics provided by societal culture to interpret organizational events (House et al., 2004). However, 
the studies in Table 1 focus only on individual practices rather than combinations of HRM practices, and 
few assess the implications for organizational performance.  
 It is therefore feasible that complementary HPWS practices to increase workforce skills, 
motivation, and opportunities to contribute may have a powerful impact on workforce attitudes, 
behaviors, and job performance. This is because HPWS send clear and reinforced messages to the 
workforce regarding the beliefs, assumptions, and strategic vision of organizational leaders (Becker & 
Huselid, 1998). For example, clarity is enhanced by the selective recruitment of applicants with 
appropriate skills and aptitudes, extensive induction to socialize new hires, incentives to reward 
productive behaviors, and team-based structures to encourage high-involvement. Reinforced messages 
sent through multiple and complementary HPWS practices may thus increase workforce certainty, clarity, 
and direction. It may be possible to suggest that a coherent HPWS will have an impact on workforce 
attitudes, behaviors, and job performance that overrides the influence of societal culture (which would 
have otherwise provided for more certainty), and will enhance organizational performance. 
 Summarizing the research model (Figure 1), societal culture may moderate the effectiveness of 
individual HPWS practices. This is consistent with GLOBE’s CLT that highlights the influence of 
societal culture on the structure and management of organizations (House et al., 2004). Congruence 
between societal culture and leadership behavior provides the organization with a system to reduce 
uncertainty and increase comfort levels, that will ultimately enhance organizational performance 
(Dorfman, Javidan, Hanges, Dastmalchian, & House, 2012; House et al., 2014). However, the combined 
effect of complementary HPWS practices, in terms of fit with organizational strategies and practices, may 
generate the certainty, clarity, and direction required to affect workforce behaviors and improve 
performance. This process, according to our conception, may supersede or substitute for the influence of 
societal culture on organizations. Extending the HRM universalistic perspective, we propose the 
alignment of different elements of HPWS may provide the certainty, clarity, and direction to 
organizational activities, and among organizational members, that would supersede the impact of societal 
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culture. Hence complementary HPWS practices reduce uncertainty in work environments to correspond 
to, or take the place of, the influence of societal culture on employee attitudes and behaviors. 
 The variation in congruence reported in Table 1 between societal culture and bundles of AMO 
practices further implies complementary skill-enhancing, motivation-enhancing, and opportunity-
enhancing practices each work together to have a positive impact on organizational performance in 
diverse countries (H2a-c). Complementarities between bundles of AMO practices may therefore increase 
certainty, clarity, and direction to organizational events. This may override the influence of societal 
culture on workforce attitudes, behaviors, and job performance, identified by CLT in uncertain work 
environments. We therefore assess whether HPWS and AMO bundles enhance organizational 
performance in diverse countries. 
      …Insert Figure 1 here… 
METHODS 
Data Collection 
We collected establishment-level data using a mixed-method, multi-case-study approach, to assess the 
HPWS-organizational performance relationship in organizations from three industries in 14 countries. 
Focusing on three industries (financial services, healthcare, and manufacturing) allowed nuanced 
generalization across service and manufacturing contexts (i.e., Combs et al., 2005), while reducing the 
potential impact of unobserved structural characteristics due to differences between industries in business 
strategy, operational structure, and occupational characteristics (Aycan, 2005; Gerhart & Fang, 2005). 
Country co-investigators (CCIs) developed a convenience sample of organizations from professional 
networks and business directories in the three industries. We selected 14 countries to vary on societal 
culture dimensions (i.e., Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, Turkey, and Vietnam). Mixed-method data collection involved a combination of 
structured interviews with managers and employee surveys in 387 organizations. We sampled an average 
28 organizations in each country ranging from 15 (Japan) to 38 (Italy). 
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In accordance with methodological recommendations in international HRM research (Cascio, 
2012), and replicating GLOBE’s approach, an international research team of fourteen CCIs representing 
all the cultures in the study co-designed standard instruments to collect field-data, refine, and check the 
conceptual and functional equivalence of measurement items. We developed questions in English, 
translated to local languages by CCIs, and back-translated to ensure translation equivalence. The principal 
project coordinator conducted one-on-one training with CCIs, and provided uniform protocols to ensure 
consistency in securing access to organizations, questions, data-collection, data-coding, and online 
uploading. 
i. Interview component. CCIs contacted and interviewed face-to-face the most senior manager 
responsible for HRM issues in each workplace. In many workplaces without a senior HRM specialist this 
is the general manager. Interviews followed a standard protocol of 56 questions and lasted over one hour. 
Questions gathered data on: organizational characteristics (e.g., age, size (number of employees), market 
competition, and ownership); workplace HPWS practices for the largest occupational group (LOG) (e.g., 
nurses in hospitals), given potential variation in practices between occupational groups; and workplace 
performance. Establishment-level surveys provide more reliable data on HRM practices than corporate-
level surveys, given variation across corporations, and establishment-level management familiarity with 
local practices and workplace performance (Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, & Snell, 2000). Audio-recording 
and transcribing interviews enabled data-entry checks and query resolution during data analysis. 
ii. Survey component. During interviews, we requested access to a random selection of 20 
employees from the workplace’s LOG to complete surveys. Employee surveys were available in paper 
form distributed in the workplace and posted to the CCI, or online through Qualtrics. It included 
questions covering demographics (15 questions), HPWS practices (17), and societal culture (13). 
Combining multiple data sources reduced the potential for common method bias and facilitated the 




The 387 organizations in 14 countries included 125 finance, 112 healthcare, and 150 manufacturing 
organizations, on average established 36 years ago, and with 6,331 parent company employees. Of these 
organizations, 85% are local/ domestically-owned companies and the rest are subsidiaries of international 
companies. Employee survey data consisted of 7,187 respondents from these workplaces, with an average 
of 19 usable responses per workplace (response rate 75%). The number of organizations and employees in 
the sample from each country ranged from 38 organizations and 747 employees (Italy), to 15 
organizations and 271 employees (Japan).    
Measures 
Organizational Performance. HPWS-organizational performance studies use varied 
organizational performance measures (Combs et al., 2006). We used two business measures: financial 
performance, given that business failure and success is the central issue in IB; and labor productivity as a 
central discipline-specific measure (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009), less distal to HPWS than 
financial performance. Both objective and subjective measures of organizational performance have 
limitations and trade-offs are required against the research context (Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Richard et 
al., 2009). We used subjective measures of organizational performance in this context, given our data is 
workplace-level where objective financial information is publicly unavailable, calculation varies 
depending on costs allocated to the workplace and organization (ibid.), and different accounting standards 
between countries hinder comparison of financial information. Furthermore, unobserved heterogeneity of 
industry and market environments affects objective performance data. Subjective measures also allow for 
differences between organizations in key financial and labor productivity indicators used to capture 
performance. 
The most senior manager responsible for HRM (often the general manager), likely involved in the 
senior management team (where performance will be frequently compared against competitors), answered 
the question -‘Compared with other workplaces in the same industry how would you assess your 
workplace’s 1) financial performance 2) labor productivity’, measured on a five-point Likert scale where 
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1=a lot below average and 5=a lot better than average. These items, taken directly from the authoritative 
Workplace Employment Relations Study (WERS) (van Wanrooy et al., 2013), are widely used in 
previous research, and correlate with objective performance measures and the determinants of workplace 
performance (Forth & McNabb, 2008). Although acknowledging the potential for measurement error, 
average correlations between subjective and objective performance measures range between 0.4 and 0.6 
(Wall et al., 2004). Meta-analysis also reports similar positive HPWS-organizational performance 
relationships in studies using objective and subjective measures (Combs et al., 2006), suggesting 
subjective performance measures are suitable in appropriate contexts.  
High-performance work systems. Following prior studies, we measured HPWS in management interviews 
by an additive index of practices. Our 17 practices measure of HPWS is broad-ranging compared to most 
studies that assess 2-13 practices (Combs et al., 2006). This helped capture an in-depth and 
comprehensive picture of the HRM system in a multi-industry sample (Becker & Huselid, 1998), and 
account for national differences in the types of practices adopted. We took the question wording from 
WERS, given extensive review of these items by scholars, pre-testing with managers, and use in national 
surveys for over 25 years and over 100 academic publications (van Wanrooy et al., 2013).2 CCIs involved 
in co-designing standard instruments agreed the question wording as appropriate and meaningful. 
Appendix A provides details on the measurement of each practice.3,4,5 Nine items are composed from 
binary measures of policies generally applied to the whole workplace, or all employees in the largest 
occupational group (LOG) (for example, ‘Is there a policy of guaranteed job security or no compulsory 
redundancies for [LOG] employees?’, ‘Have you or a third party conducted a formal attitude survey of 
your [LOG employees’] views or opinions during the past two years?’). Eight items were measured 
categorically given not all LOG employees may be affected. These questions ask the manager to calculate 
the extent to which a practice was used, in terms of the proportion of LOG employees affected (for 
example, ‘What proportion of [LOG] have been given time-off from their normal daily work duties to 
undertake training over the past 24 months?’, ‘Approximately what proportion of [LOG] are formally 
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trained to be able to do jobs other than their own?’), measured on a graded scale, for example, 0=none 
(0%), 1=just a few (1-19%), 2=some (20-39%), 3=around half (40-59%), 4=most (60-79%), 5=almost all 
(80-99%), 6=all (100%). 
AMO measures. We further categorized HPWS practices reported in the management survey into 
three AMO bundles in accordance with prior studies- skill-enhancing, motivation-enhancing, and 
opportunity-enhancing practices (e.g., Appelbaum et al., 2000; Gardner et al., 2011; Jiang et al., 2012; 
Subramony, 2009). Practices are grouped as listed in Table 1 to create three further theoretically-driven 
additive indexes.6 Prior studies demonstrate deductive validation and the item congruency of these three 
formative constructs (e.g., Gardner et al., 2011; Subramony, 2009). Companies below the threshold for a 
practice scored 1, whereas those above the threshold scored 2 for that practice. Skill-enhancing practices 
ranged from 3-6, motivation-enhancing practices from 7-14, and opportunity-enhancing practices from 7-
14. 
 Cultural dimensions. Employee surveys included established GLOBE scales to measure societal 
culture scores on power distance, institutional collectivism, and in-group collectivism (Dorfman et al., 
2012; House et al., 2004). We followed Kirkman et al.’s (2017) methodological recommendation to 
directly assess employee perceptions of societal culture using workplace-level surveys, rather than rely on 
GLOBE scores, because cultural values are not homogenous at organizational- and societal-levels (see 
also: Taras, Kirkman, & Steel, 2010). Gathering primary data on societal culture rather than relying on 
secondary sources reduced the potential for measurement error, due to in-country variation on cultural 
values (Rabl et al., 2014), and potential changes in cultural values over time since GLOBE collected 
scores in 1990 (Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2012). Reliance on GLOBE scores may also restrict the 
countries assessed (it excludes Pakistan and Vietnam in our case), and not account for increased 
workforce diversity from migration. Primary data collection, therefore, provides an important check 
against existing GLOBE scores (House et al., 2004). Significant and high Pearson product-moment 
correlations between our (new) mean scores and GLOBE scores indicated consistency in relative cultural 
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values over time (Corr.power distance=0.60, p<0.05; Corr.institutional collectivism=0.845, p<0.01; and Corr.in-group 
collectivism=0.832, p<0.01). 
 GLOBE includes two societal culture measures – practices (‘as is’) and values (‘should be’). We 
measured ‘as is’ practices to capture current perceptions in the country more relevant to our theoretical 
arguments, rather than future goals and aspirations (see: Rode et al., 2016). While other studies such as 
Hofstede (2001) and the World Value Survey (Inglehart, 1997, 2004) measure cultural values, GLOBE’s 
critique of the measurement of values suggests that individuals may not be able to report on cultural 
values or societal values, but only one’s own values (House et al., 2004). GLOBE also found little 
variation in their measure of societal values in 2004. Therefore, in the present study, we have included 
GLOBE’s measures of (‘as is’) cultural practices. Sample items with Likert scales from 1(low)-7(high) 
included: power distance ‘In this society, followers are expected to obey their leaders without question’ 
(alpha=.80); institutional collectivism ‘Being accepted by other members of a group is very important’ 
(alpha=0.67); and in-group collectivism ‘Children generally live at home with their parents until they get 
married’ (alpha=0.79).7,8  
Control variables. All equations control for GDP 2014 at societal-level and the following 
organizational-level characteristics (Jackson & Schuler, 1995), to help isolate the impact of societal 
culture on the HPWS-performance relationship, and reduce the potential impact of the lack of equivalence 
in cross-national studies: organizational age and size (employees); industry (finance, healthcare, 
manufacturing); sector (public, private, non-profit); internationally-owned subsidiary; and market 
competition (the question, ‘How would you assess the degree of competition in this market?’ assessed on 
a five-point Likert scale from 1(‘very low’)-5(‘very high’)). Finance companies and private sector 
companies were referent categories in the models reported.  
Data Analysis 
Measurement Invariance. Measurement invariance/equivalence helps validate our measures in a 
multi-national context. Specifically, we tested for structural and metric equivalence in the response styles 
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for the measures of culture. Principal component analysis of culture factors separately for each country 
helps assess construct equivalence. Lower bounds measured at the 95% confidence interval with average 
Eigenvalues >1 indicated construct equivalence (LBPower Distance=2.27, LBInstitutional Collectivism=1.49, and LBIn-
group Collectivism=2.05). Metric equivalence requires that statistical associations among dependent and 
independent variables remain relatively stable using both domestic and international data. Correlation 
matrices and factor structures should also remain similar (Cheung, 2008). We measured metric 
equivalence using the orthogonal procrustean factor rotation (Fischer & Fontaine, 2011), following 
GLOBE’s approach to compare factor structures across countries (House et al., 2014: 181-185). This 
helps determine equivalence in factor loadings for culture scales across countries. While there is no 
established cut-off point, difference in loadings remained low, with the highest difference 0.74 for one 
item in the Italian sample. Significant and high correlations between culture scores in GLOBE and our 
sample (as indicated above) further indicated the robustness of measurement.  
Data Aggregation. While defining culture at the societal-level, it is measured at the individual-
level with scores aggregated for each country. Intraclass correlations (ICCs) and RWG are widely used 
indicators in multilevel modelling to compute inter-rater agreement and reliability. These scores help 
assess the appropriateness of the aggregation of individual-level measures to societal-level (Bliese, 2000). 
Results supported aggregation: Power Distance: ICC1Power Distance=0.21 and ICC2Power Distance=0.99 
(F=132.5; p<0.001); Institutional Collectivism: ICC1Institutional Collectivism=0.18 and ICC2Institutional 
Collectivism=0.99 (F=111.8, p< 0.001); and for In-group Collectivism: ICC1In-group Collectivism=0.33 and ICC2In-
group Collectivism=0.99 (F=251.7; p <0.001). We measured inter-rater agreement using the RWG formula 
(James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) and the results support aggregation (RWGPower Distance=0.6; RWGInstitutional 
Collectivism=0.73, and RWGIn-group Collectivism=0.73). The indicators are within a range similar to previous 
country-level studies (e.g., Stephan & Pathak, 2016; Waldman et al., 2006).  
Hypothesis Testing. To examine cross-cultural and cross-level variances in the impact of HPWS 
on financial performance and labor productivity, we use country-level moderators (power distance, 
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institutional collectivism, and in-group collectivism). Hypothesizing cross-level moderating effects, we 
conduct multilevel modelling using the linear mixed effects program for R (programming language) 
(Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & Core R Team, 2014). In the model, we standardize the independent 
variables to facilitate interactions. We assessed the model fit using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the deviance (which is -2*log likelihood) for each model to establish if the model is a significant 
improvement over the previous models. Lower AIC values indicate a better model. We also used 
Nakagawa and Schielzeth’s (2013) Pseudo-R2 to check the total variance explained by the model. We 
report Marginal Pseudo-R2, which is the proportion of variance explained by the fixed factors in the 
model.9 
RESULTS 
Table 2 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations for the main variables. Tables 3-9 present the 
results of hypothesis testing using multilevel analysis to estimate main effect models followed by 
moderation models.  
…Insert Table 2 here… 
H1 predicted HPWS are positively associated with organizational performance in a diverse range 
of countries. This receives support as evidenced by the positive (γ=0.56) and significant (p=0.035) 
coefficient of HPWS on financial performance, and the positive (γ=0.76) and significant (p=0.004) 
coefficient of HPWS on labor productivity, as shown in table 3, models 1 and 5 respectively.  
     …Insert Table 3 here…  
H2 predicted (a) skill-enhancing practices, (b) motivation-enhancing practices, and (c) 
opportunity-enhancing practices are positively associated with organizational performance in a diverse 
range of countries. Table 3, models 2 and 6 (respectively) show skill-enhancing practices had positive and 
significant effects on financial performance (γ=0.13, p=0.020) and labor productivity (γ=0.19, p=0.000). 
Furthermore, opportunity-enhancing practices were positive and significantly associated with financial 
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performance (γ=0.06, p=0.015) as shown in Table 3 model 4, and labor productivity (γ=0.07, p=0.008) as 
shown in model 8 of the same table. However, motivation-enhancing practices were not significantly 
related to organizational performance in models 3 and 7 of Table 3 (Financial Performance: γ=0.01, 
p=0.847; Labor Productivity: γ=0.03, p=0.484). Therefore, H2a and H2c receive support, and H2b is not 
supported. 
Regarding high-power-distance cultures, there is no support for H3(a) proposing the relationship 
between HPWS and organizational performance is weaker in high-power-distance cultures, as shown by 
the non-significant interaction coefficient between HPWS and power distance (see Tables 4 and 5, Model 
2; Financial Performance: γ=-0.66, p=0.112; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.67, p=0.105). There is also no 
support for H3(c) proposing the relationship between motivation-enhancing practices and organizational 
performance is weaker in high-power-distance cultures, as shown by the non-significant interaction 
coefficient between motivation-enhancing practices and power distance (Table 4 and 5, Model 6; 
Financial Performance: γ=-0.01, p=0.817; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.01, p=0.831). H3(b) proposed the 
relationship between skill-enhancing practices and organizational performance is not moderated by power 
distance. This is supported given the insignificant coefficient of interaction between skill-enhancing 
practices and power distance (Tables 4 and 5, Model 4; Financial Performance: γ=-0.03, p=0.765: Labor 
Productivity: γ=0.02, p=0.805). H3(d) receives support as shown by the negative and significant 
coefficient of interaction between opportunity-enhancing practices and power distance (Financial 
Performance: γ=-0.12, p=0.003; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.11, p=0.004), reported in model 8 of tables 4 
and 5. This suggests that a 1 standard deviation rise in power distance diminishes financial performance 
and labor productivity by 11%. This effect remained significant and negative in a full model including 
other AMO bundles and interactions to check for robustness, as shown in the interaction coefficient 
between opportunity-enhancing practices and power distance in model 10 of tables 4 and 5 (Financial 
Performance: γ=-0.12, p=0.003; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.12, p=0.004).  
…Insert Table 4 and 5 here… 
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Considering in-group collectivism, we found no support for H4(a) (the relationship between 
HPWS and organizational performance is weaker in high in-group collectivism cultures), as the 
coefficient of interaction between HPWS and in-group collectivism was not significant (Tables 6 and 7, 
Model 2; Financial Performance: γ=-0.46, p=0.263; Labor Productivity: γ=0.28, p=0.491). H4(c) is also 
not supported because the coefficient of interaction between motivation-enhancing practices and in-group 
collectivism was not significant (Table 6 and 7, Model 6; Financial Performance: γ=-0.05, p=0.363; 
Labor Productivity: γ=-0.05, p=0.314). As such, in-group collectivism did not weaken the relationship 
between HPWS and organizational performance, nor between motivation-enhancing practices and 
organization performance. Both H4(b) and H4(d), proposing in-group collectivism did not have 
moderating effects, receive support. H4(b) is supported because the coefficient of interaction between 
skill-enhancing practices and in-group collectivism was not significant (Model 4 of Tables 6 and 7; 
Financial Performance: γ=-0.01, p=0.932; Labor Productivity: γ=0.11, p=0.171). H4(d) receives support 
because the coefficients of interaction between opportunity-enhancing practices and in-group collectivism 
were also not significant as predicted (Model 8 in Tables 6 and 7; Financial Performance: γ=-0.03, 
p=0.445; Labor Productivity: γ=0.05, p=0.181).  
…Insert Table 6 and 7 here… 
With regards to institutional collectivism, we found no support for H5(a) (the relationship 
between HPWS and organizational performance is stronger in high-institutional-collectivism cultures), as 
the coefficient of interaction between HPWS and institutional collectivism was not significant (Table 8 
and 9, Model 2; Financial Performance: γ=-0.21, p=0.698; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.02, p=0.972). 
Similarly, H5(c) is also not supported because the coefficient of interaction between motivation-
enhancing practices and institutional collectivism was not significant (Table 8 and 9, Model 6; Financial 
Performance: γ=-0.09, p=0.209; Labor Productivity: γ=-0.07, p=0.355). It appears these hypotheses may 
over-estimate the influence of institutional collectivism on the relationship between organizational 
performance and HPWS or motivation-enhancing practices. Both H5(b) and H5(d) receive support. H5(b) 
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is supported because the coefficient of interaction between skill-enhancing practices and institutional 
collectivism was not significant (Model 4 of Tables 8 and 9; Financial Performance: γ=-0.09, p=0.448; 
Labor Productivity: γ=0.00, p=0.978). H5(d) receives support because the coefficient of interaction 
between opportunity-enhancing practices and institutional collectivism was not significant (Model 8 in 
Tables 8 and 9; Financial Performance: γ=0.08, p=0.196; Labor Productivity: γ=0.06, p=0.326).  
…Insert Table 8 and 9 here… 
Across these findings, the negative and significant coefficient of interaction between opportunity-
enhancing practices and power distance provides the strongest indication of a societal culture effect. This 
suggests employees in high-power-distance countries may feel uncomfortable with these practices. To 
further examine the moderation effects, we plot the significant interactions following Aiken and West 
(1991), and estimate the paths at low (-1 s.d.) and high (+1 s.d.) power distance values respectively. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the moderation effect of power distance. The positive effect of opportunity-
enhancing practices on financial performance and labor productivity in low-power-distance cultures 
becomes negative or weakened in high-power-distance cultures. The non-significant interaction effects 
reported above suggest neither in-group collectivism nor institutional collectivism diminish the effect of 
HPWS, or the three AMO bundles, on organizational performance. The non-significant interaction effect 
of power distance on skill-enhancing practices and motivation-enhancing practices, similarly, indicate 
that power distance may not carry sufficient influence to affect the relationship between these practices 
and organizational performance. These unsupported hypotheses on the interaction between HPWS and 
three dimensions of societal culture indicate such complementary practices may outweigh the effect of 
cultural dimensions and enhance organizational performance across cultures.   





This study assessed whether societal culture moderates the relationship between HPWS and 
organizational performance, to evaluate competing advice offered to companies regarding the strategic 
selection of HRM practices by the universalistic and contingency perspectives. Drawing on a large 
primary dataset of organizations and countries, we find societal culture did not moderate the positive 
HPWS-organizational performance relationship, nor the effectiveness of skill-enhancing and motivation-
enhancing practices. High power distance did, however, reduce the effectiveness of opportunity-
enhancing practices.  
Our findings have several implications for HRM theory in IB/CMM studies. Conceptually, the 
findings support propositions from the universalistic perspective that existing societal culture and norms 
do not limit HPWS effectiveness (see also: Bae et al., 1998; Combs et al., 2006; Rabl et al., 2014; Yalabik 
et al., 2008). The contingency perspective and HRM culture-fit models, that recommend ‘best fit’ 
between societal culture and HRM practices to enhance organizational effectiveness (Aycan et al., 1999, 
2000), receive less support. Investment in complementary HPWS practices appears effective in all 
countries assessed. This is not culture-bound and encourages convergence towards a globally recognized 
best practice approach. 
In explaining the perhaps surprising lack of support for the contingency perspective and culture-
fit models, we emphasize prior studies have focused on individual HRM practices when reporting an 
influential role for societal culture. Individual HRM practices send ambiguous signals about human 
capital (e.g., the types of employees hired and skills required), role behaviors, and employee involvement. 
In these circumstances, GLOBE’s CLT proposes employees will rely on decision-making heuristics 
provided by societal culture (House et al., 2004). In contrast, organizations with complementary HPWS 
‘best practices’ may send clear and reinforced messages to the workforce about leadership beliefs, 
assumptions, and strategic vision. These practices in combination may increase certainty, clarity, and 
direction to organizational activities. Synergies between ‘best practices’ send unambiguous messages 
about broader strategic priorities and values.  This may help create strong HRM systems with 
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distinctiveness (e.g., visible, understandable, and relevant practices), consistency (e.g., consistent, 
instrumental, and valid practices), and consensus (e.g., agreement and fairness) across HRM practices 
(Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Ostroff & Bowen, 2016). These features of strong HRM systems encourage a 
shared and positive organizational climate, in which employees develop a common understanding of 
behaviors that are valued, rewarded, and expected. As such, employees understand how they contribute 
towards organizational performance (ibid.). As such, HPWS arguably reduce workforce reliance on rules 
of thumb provided by societal culture when responding to organizational events. Complementary HPWS 
practices may thus have a powerful impact on workforce attitudes and behaviors that outweighs the 
influence of societal culture. The methodological implication for IB/CCM studies is that focusing on 
individual HRM practices may overlook larger HRM system effects on organizational performance that a 
more macro viewpoint captures (Becker & Huselid, 1998). Future studies should, therefore, control for 
other practices in HRM systems.  
Drawing on AMO theory, we further proposed that performance would be enhanced when 
organizations create a skilled, motivated, and flexible workforce. Proposing positive effects for each 
AMO bundle of practices, we identified distinct effects on organizational performance in a cross-cultural 
context. Both skill-enhancing and opportunity-enhancing practices were positively associated with 
organizational performance. The lack of an association between motivation-enhancing practices and 
organizational performance contrasts with previous studies indicating each AMO bundle is positively 
related to organizational performance (Jiang et al., 2012). The difference in findings may reflect several 
issues. First, we studied a wide range of countries beyond those most frequently studied – the United 
States, China, Spain, United Kingdom, South Korea, and Canada (Rabl et al., 2014) - and prior findings 
may not hold in other countries (a sample composition effect). Second, the regulatory environment of 
some countries may influence the adoption and effectiveness of motivation-enhancing practices. 
Remuneration, employment security, and equality practices are legally required in highly-regulated 
countries, and do not appear feasible in others. This reduces firm heterogeneity and the scope to adopt 
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these practices for relative competitive advantage (ibid.: 1015, 1023). Third, motivation-enhancing 
practices have pecuniary implications of a gain/loss nature. Failures to deliver on pay and promotion 
promises may demotivate employees with harmful consequences for organizational performance. Fourth, 
the high costs of motivation-enhancing practices for employers may off-set any benefits from increased 
employee motivation, and result in no overall impact on organizational performance. For these reasons, 
motivation-enhancing practices alone appear insufficient to improve organizational performance. 
Systematic application of the AMO model also revealed the relationship between opportunity-
enhancing practices and organizational performance is weaker in high-power-distance countries. This is 
consistent with prior research indicating limited congruence between power distance and work 
teams/flexible-working, information-sharing, and labor-management participation (Aycan, 2005; Fey et 
al., 2009; Newman & Nollen, 1996; Ollo-López et al., 2011). Should organizations in high-power-
distance countries, therefore, avoid opportunity-enhancing practices? Our findings suggest not. While 
being aware of the processes by which managers introduce these practices in high-power-distance 
contexts, we still advise implementing HPWS. As skill-enhancing practices carefully match, induct, and 
train appropriate employees, and motivation-enhancing practices align and reward productive behaviors, 
it appears overall HPWS have a consistent association with performance in high-power-distance 
countries. However, organizations in high-power-distance contexts should only implement opportunity-
enhancing practices as part of a broader HPWS including skill-enhancing and motivation-enhancing 
practices. Consistent with Jiang et al. (2015), opportunity-enhancing practices are effective in high-
power-distance countries only as part of HRM systems that select and develop the necessary aptitudes and 
skills, and provide appropriate incentives to share decision-making.    
 Although lacking data to assess the many potential theoretical explanations for the positive impact 
of AMO bundles, we propose the following. Skill-enhancing practices may enhance human capital by 
increasing person-organization fit, defined as the compatibility of attitudes, behaviors, and skills between 
employees and the organization’s requirements. Induction/training further transmits the values, role 
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behaviors, and organizational culture required for success (Cable & Parsons, 2001; Schneider, 1987). 
Clear and consistent messages about human capital requirements should improve role clarity and job 
performance (Jackson & Schuler, 1985). 
 Motivation-enhancing practices (as part of HPWS), such as effective performance management 
systems, establish well-defined goals, monitor and review performance, and reward appropriate behaviors 
(Gardner et al., 2011; Schuler & Jackson, 1987). Employment security and flexible work arrangements 
further develop long-term employee commitment (Jiang et al., 2012; Pfeffer, 1998). Consistent messages 
provide a clear line of sight to increase role clarity, behavioral integration, and workforce commitment. 
 Opportunity-enhancing practices help to generate a high-involvement organizational structure in 
which flexible job design and team-based working provide sufficient latitude for employees to act, share 
knowledge, and learn new skills (Combs et al., 2006; Lawler, 1986; Pfeffer, 1998). Extensive 
communication, interaction, and cooperation among employees help minimize the uncertainty of work 
environments by improving networks, reciprocity, and social cohesion (Evans & Davis, 2005). 
 Hence, AMO bundles may override the influence of societal culture: skill-enhancing practices 
develop appropriate human capital, increase person-organization fit and role clarity; motivation-
enhancing practices set expectations, reward, and reinforce productive role behaviors; opportunity-
enhancing practices facilitate high-involvement social structures to enhance communication, interaction, 
and cooperation among employees.  
Drawing on GLOBE’s distinction between in-group and institutional collectivism (House et al., 
2004), and considering a wide-range of HPWS component practices, we further challenged the proposal 
of a stronger HPWS-organizational performance relationship in individualistic countries (Rabl et al., 
2014). The AMO framework helps clarify potential congruence between HPWS and aspects of societal 
culture. This shows HPWS merge a wide range of practices from successful organizations in countries as 
culturally diverse as the U.S. (e.g., individual pay incentives), Japan (e.g., work teams and information 
sharing), and central and northern Europe (e.g., extensive training and employment security) (Bae et al., 
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1998; Brewster, 1995; Yalabik et al., 2008). Prioritizing HPWS practices (e.g., individual pay incentives) 
drawn from the U.S. over other practices to suggest HPWS are congruent with individualistic countries 
(Rabl et al., 2014) is perhaps over-simplistic, as organizational performance is associated with the HPWS 
not individual practices. Initial formulations of HPWS specifically encouraged U.S. organizations to learn 
from Japanese organizations, implying organizations benefit from implementing HPWS ‘best practices’ 
drawn from a range of diverse countries. Our findings do not require organizations in Asia and Europe to 
become more like U.S. organizations (thus emphasizing the importance of cultural practices and values), 
but to implement HPWS best practices that are common features of countries with different societal 
cultures. We, therefore, propose feasible convergence towards a model of international ‘best practice’ 
HPWS (Edwards et al., 2016; Farndale, et al., 2017; Pudelko & Harzing, 2007), with an eye on cultural 
dimensions and their potential influences on organizations given our finding on power distance. 
 Several practical implications emerge from our study. First, managers seeking to improve 
organizational performance in all countries assessed here should implement HPWS practices (or bundles 
of AMO practices) rather than individual HRM practices that appear to ‘best-fit’ with societal culture. 
Incongruence with societal culture does not reduce HPWS effectiveness. Organizational leaders should 
focus on the strategic role of the HRM system and implement complementary best practices to build 
HRM systems (HPWS), rather than matching the perplexing range of individual HRM practices to 
societal cultures found across diverse countries. Second, investments in skill-enhancing and opportunity-
enhancing practices are associated with higher organizational performance in diverse countries - 
managers should implement these practices. This is a necessary condition before implementing 
motivation-enhancing practices which by themselves will not improve organizational performance. Third, 
managers should note the heterogeneous effect of societal culture across AMO bundles. The introduction 
of opportunity-enhancing practices in countries with high power distance may not improve organizational 
performance. Specifically, organizations in high-power-distance countries should introduce 




 Fourth, deeply ingrained assumptions and preferences may limit HPWS implementation even if 
potentially beneficial for organizational performance. If leaders of domestic companies or MNCs seek to 
implement HPWS, we advise presenting evidence on the positive association with organizational 
performance in diverse countries. This may help overcome resistance if managers or the workforce prefer 
practices believed to be congruent with societal culture. While acknowledging that societal culture may 
influence responses to individual HRM practices, it appears complementary HPWS and AMO bundles 
have positive effects on employee abilities, motivation, and opportunities to contribute, in diverse 
countries. Increasing workforce diversity with employees from different countries of origin, therefore, 
should not limit HPWS implementation. Fifth, the findings have important implications for governments 
seeking to increase national productivity. Encouraging HPWS implementation as a coherent system 
without immediate concern for societal culture appears likely to enhance organizational performance.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The study’s limitations include the HPWS practices and societal culture dimensions assessed, subjective 
performance measures, temporal and sampling issues. HPWS studies lack an established set of 
component practices and agreed on measurement conventions. We measured a wider range of HPWS 
practices than many previous studies (see Combs et al., 2006), and future studies may explore whether 
different HPWS measures produce similar results. Regarding societal culture dimensions, other 
dimensions not assessed here (e.g., uncertainty avoidance or future orientation) may provide more support 
for culture-fit models. In addition, we measured GLOBE’s cultural practices and not values. Incorporating 
both values and practices might have provided different insights as it has in other cross-cultural studies 
(e.g., Dorfman et al., 2012; House et al., 2014). Although HPWS studies using subjective and objective 
organizational performance measures have produced comparable findings, future studies may assess the 
moderating impact of societal culture on objective measures of organizational performance. The temporal 
issue relates to measurement of the dependent (organizational performance) and independent (HPWS 
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practices) variables in interviews up to one month before measurement of societal culture in the employee 
survey. Our findings draw on a convenience sample of organizations in three industries, and such non-
probability samples limit the ability to generalize results across societal cultures. 
Future studies may, therefore, seek to reproduce the findings using similar and different HPWS 
measures, other societal culture dimensions and measures of values, objective performance measures, 
cotemporal and longitudinal measurement, and nationally-representative samples of industries. Studies 
may further develop and test AMO theory to help explain the mechanisms through which HPWS 
enhances organizational performance. This may involve assessing the relationship between: skill-
enhancing practices, person-organization fit, and role clarity; motivation-enhancing practices and 
productive employee behaviors; and opportunity-enhancing practices and communication, interaction, 
and cooperation among employees. As such, managers may further understand the HRM practices 
required to improve business performance across societies.  
Regarding the future interface between the fields of IB/CCM and HRM (see Andersson, 
Brewster, Minbaeva, Narula, & Wood, 2019), we suggest IB/CCM should take greater interest in HRM 
practices, as rigorous quantitative data analysis identifies positive associations with organizational 
performance in a diverse range of countries. Researchers with interest in GLOBE’s CLT may explore the 
conditions in which HRM practices minimize culture’s consequences and improve organizational 
performance. Beyond societal culture, studies may also explore whether national institutional differences 
moderate the effectiveness of HPWS. We challenge HRM scholars interested in IB/CCM to focus on 
HRM systems and organizational performance, and work in international teams to gather the large data-
sets required from diverse countries. 
CONCLUSION 
Our findings suggest HPWS and AMO bundles of practices are positively associated with organizational 
performance across diverse countries and are not culture-bound. As such, international and domestic 
firms should implement these complementary practices to improve organizational performance in the 
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countries assessed, rather than seek to match individual HRM practices to societal culture. Leaders should 
focus on complementary best practices (HPWS) to develop a skilled, motivated, and flexible workforce, 
rather than the perplexing range of individual HRM practices found across diverse countries. HPWS 
provide clear leadership messages to influence workforce attitudes, behaviors, and job performance, and 
thereby enhance organizational performance. Unless leaders consider the HRM system as a whole they 
are unlikely to optimize the strategic contribution of effective workforce management to the bottom line. 
 
NOTES 
1Often-included HPWS measures are selective recruitment, training, internal promotion, incentive 
compensation, performance appraisal, employment security, work teams, flexible work, information-
sharing, participation, and grievance procedures. We excluded two of these practices. Compensation-level 
reflects national economic development and we replaced this with ‘non-pay benefits’ as likely related to 
societal culture. Staff planning is a broader strategic HRM construct rather than an HPWS practice (Rabl 
et al., 2014). Additionally, we included ‘induction programs for employee socialization’ and ‘equal 
opportunities practices’ as likely related to societal culture via country-specific norms. 
2The WERS questions and bibliography of publications using WERS, including studies assessing HPWS 
and individual component practices, are available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-
2011-workplace-employment-relations-study-wers.   
3We created an overall count index that assesses each organization’s use of HPWS practices, given prior 
studies associated combinations of these practices (rather than individual practices) with organizational 
performance (Combs et al., 2006). Theoretically-driven additive indices of HPWS practices regard these 
practices as formative rather than reflective of an underlying construct. Practices are not interchangeable 
and therefore do not co-vary, and similar results emerge as a function of practices substituting for each 
other in an appropriate index. It is therefore inappropriate to measure reliability by assessing internal 
consistency (e.g., coefficient alpha) as intercorrelation is not expected (Gardner et al., 2011).    
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4To analyze 17 measures coded on different scales, we recoded data into dichotomous high/low scores. 
Companies below the threshold for a practice (i.e. lacked that practice) scored 1, whereas companies 
above scored 2 for that practice. Consequently, the 17 HPWS indices ranged from 17-34. Robustness 
checks involved substituting dichotomous variables with standardized continuous variables and re-
analysis did not change the findings.  
5Gerhart et al. (2000) criticized HPWS measures based on single managerial respondents. Following Liao 
et al. (2009) we included several questions on HPWS practices in the employee survey to check 
measurement reliability. Correlations between practices reported by management and employee 
respondents were 0.46 (p<0.001) for performance appraisals, 0.381 (p<0.001) for employee attitude 
surveys, 0.261 (p<0.001) for quality circles, and 0.122 (p<0.05) for training. We used managerial reports 
in the analysis for the following reasons: management and employee reports of practices in our study are 
more highly correlated than in prior studies (typically a .20 correlation) (Ostroff & Bowen, 2016); our 
study focuses on more macro-level organizational practices and performance, in contrast to studies of the 
intended-implemented HR practices gap that focus on the implications for individual-level attitudes, 
behaviors, and performance; and in order to collect data on the broad range of HPWS practices (e.g., 
employees are generally not involved in recruitment and selection, labor-management participation, 
grievance procedures, and equal opportunities monitoring, and are therefore unlikely to have accurate 
perceptions on these practices). 
6Skill-enhancing practices include selective recruitment, induction, and training to increase employees’ 
knowledge, skills, and abilities (Combs et al., 2006). Motivation-enhancing practices include internal 
promotion, incentive compensation, performance appraisal, high compensation (extensive benefits), 
employment security, and flexible work arrangements (Huselid, 1995; Pfeffer, 1998). Additionally, we 
included equal opportunity practices. Opportunity-enhancing practices include work teams, flexible-
working, information-sharing (e.g., team briefings, quality-circles) (Pfeffer, 1998), and participation (e.g., 
employee attitude surveys, grievance procedures, and labor-management participation). 
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7Reliability scores for these dimensions in individual countries ranged from AlphaPakistan=0.55 to 
AlphaItaly=0.90 (Power Distance); to AlphaPakistan=0.36 to AlphaEgypt=0.81 (Institutional Collectivism); and 
AlphaJapan=0.27 to AlphaIndia=0.86 (In-Group Collectivism). Although we could drop data from countries 
where the scale fell below the 0.6 Cronbach’s alpha threshold from the analysis, they are retained given 
good overall alpha reliability for countries overall. 
8While the Cronbach alphas were low for specific countries on the two collectivism scores, the interaction 
effects did not emerge as significant. However, the Cronbach alpha for power distance (a significant 
moderator of opportunity-enhancing practices) fell below the threshold for only the Pakistan sample. The 
findings remained the same after re-running the analysis for the dataset after eliminating the Pakistan 
sample. We are therefore satisfied low reliability measures did not affect the findings.  
9R2 indicates the total variance explained by the predictors in a linear model. One disadvantage of this 
indicator is that it tends to favor more complex models. To counter such tendencies, Information Criterion 
through Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is preferred. AIC selects the model that produces a probability 
distribution with the smallest discrepancies from a true distribution. AIC indices are badness of fit 
indices, therefore a good model is one that has the minimum AIC among others (Busemeyer & Diedrich, 
2014). Deviance (i.e. -2*log likelihood) indicates the difference between the log likelihood of the 
saturated model and log likelihood of the fitted model. Recently, Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013) 
proposed two measures of Pseudo-R2 for mixed models. This measure is appropriate because it honors the 
multilevel structure where there is partitioning of variance. This Pseudo-R2 is variance explained for 
linear models and Nakagawa and Schielzeth (2013) acknowledge it is only an approximation. We 
therefore report even small values of Pseudo-R2. We report Marginal Pseudo-R2 which describes the 
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Table 1: Congruence between HPWS, AMO bundles and three societal culture dimensions 
HPWS/ AMO 
Bundles  
Societal Culture Dimensions 
 High power distance In-group collectivism Institutional collectivism 
Skill-enhancing practices (Panel 1) 
Selective 
recruitment 
-(Ryan et al., 1999: 
363-4) 
+ -(Aycan, 2005: 
1088-9) 
 
Induction    
Training -(Coget, 2011; Peretz 
& Rosenblatt, 2011; 
Rabl et al., 2014: 1013) 
 +(Aycan, 2005: 1097; 
Rode et al., 2016: 475-6) 
Motivation-enhancing practices (Panel 2) 
Internal 
promotion 
-(Aycan, 2005: 1103) +(Aycan, 2005: 1088; 




-(Aycan, 2005: 1106; 
Newman & Nollen, 
1996) 
-(Aycan, 2005: 1106; 
Chiang & Birtch, 
2010: 1371-2; Peretz 
& Fried, 2012; Schuler 




-(Aycan, 2005: 1095; 
Chiang & Birtch, 2010; 
Peretz & Fried, 2012) 
-(Aycan, 2005: 1095; 
Chiang & Birtch, 
2010: 1371-2; Peretz 




+(Aycan, 2005: 1107)  +(Aycan, 2005: 1106-7) 
Employment 
security 
  +(Aycan, 2005: 1106-7) 
Flexible work 
arrangements 
-(Peretz et al., 2018) -(Peretz et al., 2018) +(Aycan, 2005: 1106-7) 
-(Peretz et al., 2018) 
Equal 
opportunities 
-(Peretz et al., 2015: 
878) 
-(Peretz et al., 2015: 
877-8) 
+(Aycan, 2005: 1106-7) 
-(Peretz et al., 2015: 877-
8) 
Opportunity-enhancing practices (Panel 3) 
Work teams -(Aycan et al., 2000; 
Carl et al., 2004; Hui et 
al., 2004; Ollo-López 
et al., 2011) 
+(Aycan, 2005: 1100; 
Kirkman & Shapiro, 
1997) 




-(Aycan et al., 2000; 
Hui et al., 2004) 





-(Carl et al., 2004; 
Ollo-López et al., 






-(Carl et al., 2004; 
Ollo-López et al., 







-(Carl et al., 2004; 









-(Carl et al., 2004; 
Ollo-López et al., 
2011; Newman & 
Nollen, 1996) 
  
Notes: +congruence between practice and societal culture dimension  
-incongruence between practice and societal culture dimension 




Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of main variables  
Variables  Mean SD  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Organizational-level variables  
1. Organizational size (log) 2.17 0.75 1 
            
2. Organizational age (log)  1.33 0.46 0.26** 1 
           
3. Market competition 3.79 1.16 0.00 0.04 1 
          
4. HPWS 1.46 0.16 0.24** 0.16** 0.10 1 
         
5. Skill-enhancing practices 1.59 0.26 0.23** 0.11* -0.04 0.59** 1 
        
6. Motivation-enhancing practices  1.44 0.17 0.15** 0.05 0.11* 0.65** 0.15** 1 
       
7. Opportunity-enhancing practices  1.43 0.24 0.16** 0.16** 0.09 0.84** 0.37** 0.23** 1 
      
8. Financial performance  3.54 0.82 0.14** 0.02 0.05 0.17** 0.16** 0.06 0.16** 1 
     
9. Labor productivity  3.47 0.81 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 0.13** 0.17** 0.02 0.12* 0.59** 1 
    
Country-level variables  
10. GDP 2014  1108.31 1051.71 -0.02 0.11* 0.00 0.16** 0.05 0.00 0.23** -0.06 -0.15** 1 
   
11. Power distance  4.48 0.96 -0.05 0.04 0.16** -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 1 
  
12. Institutional collectivism  4.31 0.46 0.13* -0.02 -0.19** 0.06 0.11* -0.01 0.05 0.17** 0.14** 0.01 -0.38** 1 
 
13. In-group collectivism  4.90 0.71 0.05 -0.31** -0.09 -0.16** -0.13* 0.01 -0.19** 0.04 0.10 -0.65** -0.17** 0.40** 1 
  *p<.05, **p<.01 
Excludes industry, ownership, and internationally-owned subsidiary measured nominally.  




Table 3: The effects of HPWS and AMO bundles on financial performance and labor productivity across societal cultures 
























  Financial Performance Labor Productivity 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  
(Intercept) -0.69 0.41 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.08 -1.16** 0.40 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level 
controls                  
Organizational size 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Organizational age 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 
Market competition 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Health Industry -0.16 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.11 
Manufacturing Industry -0.10 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.11 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.10 
Public Ownership -0.18 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.17 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.20 
Internationally-owned subsidiary -0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.12 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control                  
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level 
predictors                   
HPWS 0.56* 0.26        0.76** 0.26       
Skill-enhancing practices   0.13* 0.06        0.19*** 0.06     
Motivation-enhancing practices   
 
 0.01 0.04      
 
 0.03 0.04   
Opportunity-enhancing practices       
 




 0.07** 0.03 
Model fit                                 
AIC 835.97 834.99 840.49 834.46 829.59 825.65 837.59 831.03 
Deviance  809.98 808.98 814.5 808.46 803.58 799.66 811.58 805.04 
Marginal Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Lower AIC values depict better models.  
1: Low Beta values and Std. errors for GDP 2014 =<0.0001.  
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Table 4: The moderating effect of power distance on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and financial performance 



























Beta Std. Error. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
(Intercept) -0.69 0.41 -0.55 0.42 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15* 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.12* 0.06 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 
Organizational age 0.01 0.1 0 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.1 
Market competition 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Health Industry -0.16 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.21 0.11 -0.21 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.22* 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.22 0.11 
Manufacturing 
Industry  
-0.1 0.1 -0.09 0.1 -0.11 0.1 -0.11 0.1 -0.14 0.1 -0.14 0.1 -0.11 0.1 -0.14 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.14 0.1 
Public Ownership -0.18 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.17 0.12 -0.14 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.14 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.03 0.2 0.06 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.08 0.2 0.08 0.2 0.06 0.2 0.09 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.06 0.2 
Internationally-
owned subsidiary 
-0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.1 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.12 0.12 -0.09 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control 
GDP 20141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor 
HPWS 0.56* 0.27 0.46 0.27                                 
Skill-enhancing 








                        0.06* 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor 
Power distance (PD) 0 0.06 0.97 0.62 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 
Cross-level 
interactions                                         
HPWS X PD     -0.66 0.41                               
SEHR X PD             -0.03 0.1                     0.03 0.10 
MEHR X PD                     -0.01 0.06             0.03 0.06 
OEHR X PD                             -0.12** 0.04     -0.12** 0.04 
Model fit 
AIC 837.97 837.35 836.94 838.85 842.45 844.39 836.42 829.26 837.59 834.49 
Deviance  809.96 807.34 808.94 808.84 814.44 814.38 808.42 799.26 805.58 796.5 
Marginal Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Lower AIC values depict better models. 1: Note as table 3. 
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Table 5: The moderating effect of power distance on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and labor productivity  






























  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
(Intercept) -1.17** 0.41 -1.03* 0.41 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Organizational age -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.08 0.10 
Market competition -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Health Industry  -0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.06 0.11 -0.07 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.11 
Manufacturing 
Industry  0.18 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.14 0.10 
Public Ownership -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.03 0.12 
Voluntary 
Ownership 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.01 0.20 
Internationally-
owned subsidiary -0.10 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.07 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control 
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor 
HPWS 0.76** 0.26 0.66* 0.27                 
Skill-enhancing 
practices (SEHR)     0.19 0.06 0.20 0.06         0.16** 0.06 0.17** 0.06 
Motivation-
enhancing practices 
(MEHR)         0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04     0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Opportunity-
enhancing practices 
(OEHR)             0.07** 0.03 0.06* 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor 
Power distance (PD) 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.61 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Cross-level interactions 
HPWS X PD   -0.67 0.41                 
SEHR X PD       0.02 0.09           0.08 0.10 
MEHR X PD           -0.01 0.06       0.02 0.07 
OEHR X PD 






AIC 831.53 830.82 827.65 829.59 839.59 841.55 833.02 826.53 829.19 826.70 
Deviance  803.54 800.82 799.66 799.58 811.58 811.54 805.02 796.52 797.10 788.70 
Marginal Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.08 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Lower AIC values depict better models. 1: Note as table 3. 
 
Table 6: The moderating effect of in-group collectivism on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and financial performance  
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
(Intercept) -0.70 0.41 -1.07* 0.53 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.12* 0.06 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.14* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 
Organizational age 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.10 
Market competition 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 
Health Industry  -0.15 0.11 -0.14 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.17 0.11 
Manufacturing Industry  -0.10 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.10 0.10 
Public Ownership -0.18 0.12 -0.19 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.17 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.14 0.12 -0.17 0.12 -0.18 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.20 
Internationally-owned subsidiary -0.11 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.12 0.12 -0.13 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control  
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor  
HPWS 0.56* 0.27 0.81* 0.35                         
Skill-enhancing practices (SEHR)         0.13* 0.06 0.13 0.07                 
Motivation-enhancing practices 
(MEHR)                 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04         
Opportunity-enhancing practices 
(OEHR)                         0.06* 0.03 0.08* 0.03 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor  
In-group collectivism (IG) 0.01 0.07 0.68 0.60 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 
Cross-level interactions  
HPWS X IG     -0.46 0.41                         
SEHR X IG             -0.01 0.08                 
MEHR X IG                     -0.05 0.05         
OEHR X IG                             -0.03 0.04 
Model fit  
AIC 837.95 838.65 836.98 838.98 842.49 843.64 836.46 837.86 
Deviance  809.94 808.66 808.98 808.98 814.5 813.64 808.46 807.86 
Marginal Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 




Table 7: The moderating effect of in-group collectivism on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and labor productivity  


















Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
(Intercept) 
-
1.16** 0.41 -0.93 0.52 -0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Organizational age -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.11 0.10 
Market competition -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
Health Industry  -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.06 0.11 
Manufacturing Industry  0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.10 
Public Ownership -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.12 -0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.20 -0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.20 
Internationally-owned subsidiary -0.10 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.07 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control 
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor 
HPWS 0.76** 0.26 0.61 0.34             
Skill-enhancing practices (SEHR)     0.19 0.06 0.14* 0.07         
Motivation-enhancing practices 
(MEHR)         0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04     
Opportunity-enhancing practices 
(OEHR)             0.07** 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor 
In-group collectivism (IG) -0.01 0.07 -0.41 0.59 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 
Cross-level interactions 
HPWS X IG   0.28 0.40             
SEHR X IG       0.11 0.08         
MEHR X IG           -0.05 0.05     




















































Table 8: The moderating effect of institutional collectivism on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and financial 
performance  

























  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
(Intercept) -0.69 0.41 -0.76 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.12* 0.06 0.12* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 0.13* 0.06 
Organizational age 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.10 
Market competition 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Health Industry  -0.16 0.11 -0.15 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.20 0.11 -0.17 0.11 -0.19 0.11 
Manufacturing Industry -0.10 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.15 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 
Public Ownership -0.19 0.12 -0.19 0.12 -0.19 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.15 0.12 -0.18 0.12 -0.17 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.20 
Internationally-owned subsidiary -0.11 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.11 0.12 -0.10 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control 
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor 
HPWS 0.56* 0.27 0.61* 0.30 0.13* 0.06 0.15* 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06* 0.03 0.05 0.03 
Skill-enhancing practices (SEHR)                 
Motivation-enhancing practices 
(MEHR)                 
Opportunity-enhancing practices 
(OEHR)                 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor 
Institutional collectivism (ICG) 0.02 0.09 0.32 0.79 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 
Cross-level interactions 
HPWS X ICG   -0.21 0.53             
SEHR X ICG       -0.09 0.11         
MEHR X ICG           -0.09 0.08     
OEHR X ICG               0.08 0.06 

























































Table 9: The moderating effect of institutional collectivism on the relationship between HPWS and AMO bundles and labor productivity  
























  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  
(Intercept) -1.17** 0.40 -1.17** 0.45 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Level 1: Organizational-level controls 
Organizational size 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Organizational age -0.12 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.09 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.11 0.10 
Market competition -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
Health Industry  -0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.06 0.11 
Manufacturing Industry 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 
Public Ownership 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.12 
Voluntary Ownership 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.07 0.20 
Internationally-owned subsidiary  -0.10 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.10 0.12 -0.09 0.12 
Level 2: Societal-level control 
GDP 20141 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Level 1: Organizational-level predictor 
HPWS 0.76** 0.26 0.77* 0.30             
Skill-enhancing practices (SEHR)     0.19 0.06 0.19** 0.06         
Motivation-enhancing practices 
(MEHR)         0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04     
Opportunity-enhancing practices 
(OEHR)             0.07** 0.03 0.06* 0.03 
Level 2: Societal-level predictor 
Institutional collectivism (ICG) -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.78 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
Cross-level interactions 
HPWS X ICG   -0.02 0.53             
SEHR X ICG       0.00 0.11         
MEHR X ICG           -0.07 0.07     
OEHR X ICG               0.06 0.06 




















































*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Lower AIC values depict better models. 1: Note as table 3. 


















APPENDIX A: Construction of HPWS and AMO bundles 
HPWS Items 
Skill-Enhancing Practices- employees have appropriate knowledge, skills and abilities 
Selective recruitment  When filling vacancies at this workplace for [LOG], do you ever conduct any 
type of personality or attitude test? When filling vacancies at this workplace 
for [LOG], do you ever conduct any type of performance or competency test? 
(No tests conducted/yes). 1=none, 2=either or both. 
  
Induction Is there a standard orientation/induction program designed to introduce new 
[LOG] to this workplace? (yes/no). [If yes] How much time do [LOG] spend 
on orientation/induction activities? (hours) 1=<16 hours, 2=16 hours+. 
  
Training  What proportion of [LOG] have been given time-off from their normal daily 
work duties to undertake training over the past 24 months?1 1=<60%, 
2=60%+. 
  
Motivation-Enhancing Practices- employee motivation to provide discretionary effort  
Internal labor market  Which of these statements best describes your approach to filling vacancies at 
this workplace? [card shown] Internal applicants are our only source, no 
external recruitment (=2); internal applicants are given preference, other 
things being equal, over external applicants (=2); applications from internal 
and external applicants are treated equally (=1); external applicants are given 
preference, other things being equal, over internal applicants (=1); external 
applicants are only source (=1).  
  
Incentive compensation Do any of [LOG] in this workplace get paid by results or receive merit pay? 
[If yes] What proportion of [LOG] at this workplace are paid in this way/ in 
either of these ways?1 1=<60%, 2=60%+. 
  
Performance appraisal Do [LOG] employees have their performance formally appraised? [If yes] 
What proportion of [LOG] employees at this workplace have there 
performance formally appraised?11=<60%, 2=60%+. 
  
Benefits Are [LOG] entitled to any of these non-pay terms and conditions? Sick pay in 
excess of statutory requirements; more than 28 days of paid annual leave 
(including public holidays); private health insurance; company vehicle or 
vehicle allowance; employer contributions to a pension scheme. 1=<3 
provided, 2=3+ provided. 
  
Employment security Is there a policy of guaranteed job security or no compulsory redundancies 




Do you provide [LOG] employees with any of the following working time 
arrangements at this workplace? (yes/no) Working only during school term-
times; the ability to change set working hours; compressed hours; the ability 
to reduce working hours; job-sharing schemes; flexi-time; work at or from 
home in normal working hours. 1=<3 available, 2=at least 3 available. 
  
Equal opportunities Do you monitor recruitment and selection by any of the following 
characteristics? (yes/no) Gender, ethnic background, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, religion or beliefs. Do you monitor promotions by any of these 
62 
 
characteristics? (yes/no for each). 1=<3 characteristics monitored, 2=at least 3 
characteristics monitored. 
  
Opportunity-Enhancing Practices- employees offered opportunities to contribute towards 
organizational objectives. 
  
Work teams What proportion, if any, of [LOG] at this workplace work in formally-
designated teams? 1 1=<60%, 2=60%+. 
  
Flexible work (Functional 
flexibility) 
Approximately what proportion of [LOG] are formally trained to be able to 




How frequently do you have meetings between line managers or supervisors 
and [LOG] for whom they are responsible? These are sometimes known as 
‘briefing groups’ or ‘team briefings’. 1=none, <once every three months, 




Do you have groups of [LOG] employees at this workplace that solve specific 
problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality? They are sometimes 
known as problem-solving groups, quality circles or continuous improvement 
groups. [If yes] In the last 12 months, roughly what proportion of [LOG] 
employees have been involved in them?1 1=<60%, 2=60%+. 
  
Employee attitude survey Have you or a third party conducted a formal attitude survey of your [LOG] 
employees’ views or opinions during the past two years? 1=no, 2=yes. 
  
Grievance procedures Is there a formal procedure for dealing with individual grievances raised by 
any [LOG] employee at this workplace? [If yes] Are [LOG] employees 
required to set out in writing the nature of the grievance? Are [LOG] 
employees asked to attend a formal meeting with a manager to discuss the 
nature of their grievance? Do [LOG] employees have a right to appeals 
against a decision made under the procedure? 2=yes to all, 1=no procedure or 




Are there any committees of managers and employees at workplace primarily 
concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation? These committees may 
be called joint consultative committees, works councils or representative 
forums. 1=no, 2=yes  
1 0=none (0%), 1=just a few (1-19%), 2=some (20-39%), 3=around half (40-59%), 4=most (60-79%), 
5=almost all (80-99%), 6=all (100%). 
